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Bellevue Hospital Center is a large, metropolitan, Level I
trauma, tertiary care teaching hospital 2.5 miles (4 km) from
the World Trade Center. Despite the inevitable chaos and
confusion surrounding the attack on 11 September 2001, we
were able to organize and deploy effective resources within
hours. In this article, we describe and retrospectively analyze
our actions in the hope that it will lead to improved response
to future disasters.
Responding to facts, not rumors
In the first few hours following the attack, communication was
poor and rumors were rampant. The hospital’s internal and
external phone lines were overloaded and a dial tone was
unavailable; internal and external pagers and cell phones
were working only intermittently. Given the sketchy and unreli-
able nature of the information, our hospital’s response was to
fully prepare all areas for a worst-case scenario involving high
volumes of critically injured patients. The Anesthesiology
Department alone reported a cost of over US$20,000 for the
period 11–12 September 2001, which was attributed to
setting up all operating rooms, drawing up drugs, opening
consumables, and lending out equipment that was never
returned. Much of this expense could have been prevented.
Better media equipment and handheld two-way radios could
have overcome the communication problems. Hospital
command centers should be equipped with radios, cable and
antenna television, and Internet access. Broadband Internet
access and certain satellite-linked devices, neither of which
depend on telephone landline integrity, proved themselves reli-
able sources of media information. Our broadband Internet
backbone performed flawlessly, enabling us to download
media news sites, such as CNN. Some portable personal
digital assistants have satellite-based Internet capabilities and,
in fact, traders on Wall Street found these worked throughout
the attack. Future preparations may be able to take advantage
of these reliable components and applications of the Internet.
To date, however, this technology is not widely available.
At Bellevue, with better communication, staff in secondary
and tertiary care areas could have anticipated the lag time
from triage to the patients’ arrival in the departments. Instead
of opening kits and trays, spiking extra intravenous drips, and
moving patients, staff could have waited until there was some
indication from the triage areas (either within the hospital or
at the attack site) that such actions would be needed. Fur-
thermore, the Outpatient Department was converted into a
makeshift emergency room, and the cystoscopy and obstet-
rics operating rooms were prepared for general surgery and
trauma. If resources were to become overwhelmed, however,
it would be better to triage and coordinate resources across
the whole of the city, rather than adapt current, local
resources. In other words, the first step should involve maxi-
mizing familiar systems, locations, equipment, chains of
command, and routes of communication before mobilizing
auxiliary resources.
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Abstract
This report describes selected aspects of the response by Bellevue Hospital Center to the World
Trade Center attack of 11 September 2001. The hospital is 2.5 miles (4 km) from the site of the attack.
These first-hand observations and this analysis may aid in future preparations. Key issues described
relate to communication, organization, injuries treated, staffing, and logistics.
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Organizing staff and volunteers
The attack occurred in the morning of a normal working day
and so the hospital was fully staffed. In addition, hundreds of
volunteers arrived. Many were trained professionals. With so
many people available it was important to organize them, with
face-to-face communication supplementing what technology
could not provide.
Medical students were employed as ‘runners’ within the hos-
pital. They know the personnel, the equipment, and the way
around the hospital. Two or three runners were assigned to
each organizing attending doctor and senior resident. This
enabled people to ask for and have supplies delivered, to
communicate back to their superiors, and to keep themselves
and others apprised of the situation in other areas of the hos-
pital. At first, identifying staff was difficult, which hampered
communication. Eventually we asked each person to affix a
piece of tape to their shirt labeled with their name, specialty,
and academic training level or title. However, all this was only
possible because of the number of staff available. Had the
attack occurred during the night or the weekend, it would
have been difficult to communicate with staff at home, even if
they could have arranged transport in to the hospital.
As well as the health care staff, there are the hospital engineers.
Had there been an influx of critically injured patients, most of
whom would need oxygen, the hospital’s ability to maintain wall
oxygen pressure, suction, and electrical power would have been
tested, especially if the main power failed and an emergency
generator was in use. Often, the capacity of emergency genera-
tors is unable to meet the demands of large equipment, such as
computed tomography scanners, as happened at New York
Downtown Hospital within hours of the attack. Although it was
not required in this case, clearly someone should be assigned to
control and conserve these resources.
During a terrorist incident, follow-up attacks may be timed to
injure the emergency services. In the event of a chemical
attack, or especially a communicable biological attack, hospi-
tal workers are directly threatened. Adequate security is
imperative, the provision of which may be difficult given that
hospital security will probably be overwhelmed and municipal
police have other obligations.
Triage and injuries
Given the circumstances, our triage functioned as well as
could be expected. As patients emerged from ambulances,
they were triaged to one of three areas: green, yellow, or red.
The Green Area was for those cases that seemed nonurgent
and was managed primarily by our Emergency Department
physicians. The Yellow Area was for potentially urgent cases.
Patients triaged to the Yellow Area had primary and sec-
ondary surveys conducted by a surgical team consisting of a
trauma surgeon (the Yellow Area coordinator) and a critical
care anesthesiologist. They assessed which other services
and staff would be needed and called them forward from an
adjacent staff holding area. Anyone potentially needing airway
management or sedation was assigned a senior anesthesiol-
ogy resident or intensive care unit fellow, who would stay with
that patient throughout his/her workup and into the operating
room or intensive care unit if necessary. This technique for
managing staff limited the crowd at the bedside while ensur-
ing that an adequate supply of experts were at hand. The Red
Area consisted of our usual Level I trauma facilities and staff.
Ninety patients were received at Bellevue Hospital Center in
the 5 hours following the attack, 56 of which had minor
injuries. Most patients treated in the Green Area had respira-
tory complaints, such as particulate inhalation and toxic fume
exposure, and psychological trauma. Five patients were
triaged to the Yellow Area suffering from a mixture of frac-
tures, burns, and blunt trauma but with stable hemodynamics.
Three patients were triaged to the Red Area: one was in blunt
cardiac arrest and pronounced dead after a brief period of
advanced trauma life support, one had been trampled, and
the third had an open head injury. Five operations were per-
formed during the first 5 hours: two neurosurgical proce-
dures, two orthopedic procedures, and one escharotomy.
Over the next 10 hours, a further 80 patients were received
with a similar distribution of injury and severity.
Reacting to the facts
As late as 72 hours after the World Trade Center attack, we
were told to be prepared for further building collapses and
subsequent injuries. Given the state of the communication, it
was difficult to anticipate needs and to deploy personnel. As
soon as possible, however, we scaled down and sent staff to
rest, dividing teams into shifts while remaining ready for
follow-up attacks or continuing casualties. To have our entire
force on standby continuously would have severely impaired
our ability to respond when asked.
We also had to remember the patients who were hospitalized
before the attack. It seems obvious to mention, but the tempta-
tion is to focus exclusively on the incident, which can poten-
tially lead to neglect of patients whose condition we presume
to know.
The Chelsea Piers field hospital
A field hospital was set up at Chelsea Piers, which is
2.2 miles (3.5 km) from the World Trade Center and 2.0 miles
(3.2 km) from Bellevue. We were asked to provide staff and
equipment to the field hospital, but soon realized this did not
include provision of anesthesia. Intravenous narcotics and
ketamine were sent over, some of which was distributed to
other teams and remains missing. This unanticipated issue
has to be addressed and, in future, we plan to distribute intra-
venous drug kits to each provider and expect them to be
accountable for their use, wastage or return.
Bellevue Hospital Center staffed three of the 100 Red Area
beds set up at Chelsea Piers. However, no significant casual-r
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ties arrived at that facility and it was dismantled at around
01:30 the next day (Wednesday), 17 hours after the attack.
Several of our staff also reported to the area of the World
Trade Center where field triage areas had been set up. They
assisted in treating and transporting back to Bellevue the few
trapped crush victims who were found and extricated that
night.
Conclusion
Practice and drills may facilitate disaster response but most
of our staff had not participated in any prior to the World
Trade Center attack. Despite this, we were struck with the
level of preparedness and resources mustered throughout
the city in a short time. Because Bellevue Hospital is a busy,
urban, Level I trauma center, we were equipped and capable
of treating the types of injuries we saw as a result of the
World Trade Center attack. This may not have been the case
if the attack had been biological or chemical.
Given the unpredictability of terrorist attacks, disaster plans
will inevitably need to be adapted to each institution and situ-
ation. In addition to standard protocols, we have identified
certain indispensable aspects of preparation based on our
observations and experience. Some of these aspects, such
as biological/chemical disaster training, security, and reliable
communication, will need to be developed and improved.
Others such as training for conventional casualties, a clear
chain of command, cooperation, flexibility, and resourceful-
ness are clearly adequate.
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This article, and the series it is part of, is dedicated to the first respon-
ders – fire, police and medical personnel – who attended the World
Trade Center disaster of 11 September 2001. They did not hesitate to
place themselves in harm's way to rescue the innocent, and without
their efforts many more would have perished. They will not be forgotten.
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